Journal of Political Science
Volume 33

Number 1

Article 1

November 2005

The Framing of the EU Constitution: An American Constitutional
Perspective
Timothy S. Boylan

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Boylan, Timothy S. (2005) "The Framing of the EU Constitution: An American Constitutional Perspective,"
Journal of Political Science: Vol. 33 : No. 1 , Article 1.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol33/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu.

The Framing of the
EU Constitution: An American
Constitutional Perspective
Timothy S. Boylan
Winthrop University
The ji·aming and enac tm ent of the Constitution
of the
Europea n Union invites comparison
with its American
counte rpart , the Constitution
of the United States . Many
of th e conflicts
that animated the Philad elphia convention of 1787 were pres e nt during the EU conference:
the
question
of power distribution
among larg e and small
states, the amount of power that a centra l government
wou ld exercise and the ca ll for specific rig ht s and prot ect ions to be codified within the text. Yet the European
delega tes did not rese mble the American framers, nor did
they craf t a text that hold s much resemblance
to the U.S.
docu m ent . The differences
have enabled the EU to create
a uniquely European constitution,
but it has also resulted
in a degree of complexity-in
both its proc ed ural and
subs tanti ve pro visions-that
the U.S. Constitution
was
ab l e to avoid. The document as approved faces considerab l e c hall enges concerning
its scope, clarity and legiti macy as th e ratifi cation phase takes pla ce.

Author's Note: I wish to thank Christian Jensen, Dan Sabia and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this article. I also
wish to thank Ap1il Lovegrove at Winthrop University for her invaluable administrative
help throughout this last year.
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INTRODUCTION

n July of 2003, the European Commission's Constitutio n
Committee released its draft document: a constitution that
was a product of sixteen months of debate and deliberatio n.
The Committee considered over 7000 amendments and revisions
along the way to a final text of over 300 pages. The propose d
Constitution had broad political and economic goals. In terms of
its political arrangements, the European Union sought a single
text that would codify the multiple and overlapping treaties that
had preceded it. In an age of independence movements, nationa lism and "Balkanization," Europe hoped that a well-crafted constitution would serve as a point of unification, bringing its
citizens closer to the common purposes of the Union. The framers also hoped that it would assist Europe in becoming an effective competitor to the United States within the global economy.
Finally, a Charter of Fundamental Rights was folded into the text
as a manifesto of personal and collective rights that was to be an
expression of 21st Century ethics and worldview.
Within a few months it was apparent that there were deep divisions between the member states, and that the reasons for arguing and disagreeing were stronger than the reasons for
compromising and agreeing. A number of these disagreeme nts
concerned matters of substance, in particular the amount of
power to be granted to a central EU government and the distrib ution of voting power among the member states. What underlay
these conflicts was equally significant and far more difficult to
address . Advocates of the draft constitution had to convince fellow delegates that acceptance would not threaten national sovereignty, nor exacerbate old tensions and rivalries. 1 This case had

I

1
An intriguing challenge to advocates of EU enlargem ent and integration has been the
emergence of new alliances and rivalries both during and following the accession of ten
new member nations in May of2004 (see note 3). While many questions of power dis triNote continues

THE JOURNAL

OF POL!Tl CJ\L SC JEN CE

THE FRAMING OF THE EU CONSTITUTION

3

to be made, moreover, while the EU was preparing to accept ten
new members-most from the old Soviet bloc-and enlarge to
25 member states. A European Union of greater diversity and
more pronounced differences was developing on a parallel track
with the drafting of the constitutional text. By October, the leaders of the 25 present and future EU members broke off talks and
headed home after reaching an impasse over voting power. By
mid-December, negotiations collapsed and the constitutional
treaty was, for the moment, shelved. Plans were made for reconsideration under new EU leadership 2 before the May, 2004 reception of the ten new member nations. 3 In June of 2004,
representatives from member nations agreed upon an end product that somehow endured the strain of satisfying the different
interests of the 25 signatory nations.
In 2005, the EU Constitution faces approval debates and
votes across the European continent. As an evaluation of the
process of constitutional enactment and in anticipation of the
process of ratification, this study will examine the content, structure and procedural mechanisms of the EU Constitution from the
bution can be seen in terms of "old" versus "new" Europe , or large versus small nations,
some new partnerships have developed . One example was the alliance between Spain and
Poland during the late 2003 conferences as discussed later in this text. Another is the
economic pronouncements made by the more "euroskeptical " nations of Britain and
Estonia concerning economic competition and the call for lower levels of taxation. This
followed the writing of a joint article by Estonian Prime Minister Juhan Parts and British
Prime Minister Tony Blair, 'The Enlarged EU Must be Free to Compete ," Financial
Times, 2 November 2003, p. 21.
2
The rotating leadership of the EU passed from Italy to Ireland at the end of 2003. Many
participants held out hope that the Irish, minus the controversial and divisive Silvio Berlusconi, would be able to bring the delegates back together in the Spring of 2004, and
achieve an approved document by June . That did in fact prove to be the case .
3
The following nations acceded to EU membership on May I, 2004: Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, Czech Republic , Hungary, Slovakia , and Poland .
They will join the current 15 member states : Belgium, Denmark , Germany , Greece,
Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg , Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom .
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perspective of American constitutional theory. I posit that fruitful
and intriguing avenues of analysis and evaluation are revealed
when the framing and debate of the EU Constitution is compared
and contrasted with that of its 1787 counterpart , the Constitution
of the United States. My plan is to assess not only the content of
the EU document (which has received considerable attention in
the European press), but also its overall structure and design, or
context. By locating and evaluating the main substantive and
procedural challenges posed by the EU Constitution , and by
drawing comparisons with the U.S. case, I provide both diagnostic and prescriptive insights. For the ratification and ultimate success of the document is not a foregone conclusion. European
leaders struggled for over two years to draft and finalize one of
the most ambitious and far-reaching governing documents in
human history. The ultimate success or failure of this Constitution (and all of the smaller successes and failures along the way)
will provide valuable lessons that will animate and inspire the
task of constitution-making in the years to come .
CONTEXT:
THE WHO, WHAT, WHE , WHERE,AND
CO STITUTION MAKING

HOW OF

One of the main purposes of this study is to demonstrate that
the process of constitution making can often be as important, if
not more important, than the product that emerges from debate,
deliberation, and writing. A number of historical and contextual
observations indicate that certain advantages present during the
American founding were not found within the recent Convention
for the Future of Europe.
We The People?
A perusal of the proposed Constitution of the European Union
shows some interesting parallels with, as well as some important
T HE J OU RNA L
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departures from, its American counterpart. The Preamble of the
U.S. text makes clear where primary authority rests, and from
where power and legitimacy are gained. All powers granted to
government are from the people. States remain sovereign, and
the constitutional language links the people and the states as
sources of authority, but final authority is with the people. 4 There
is a sense of hierarchy throughout the document as powers are
delegated to the national government, and then clearly enumerated, while others are reserved to the states and, ultimately, to the
people. As J.H.H.Weiler (200 I, 56) has noted, "In federations,
whether American or Australian, German or Canadian, the institutions of a federal state are situated in a constitutional framework which presupposes the existence of a 'constitutional
demos,' a single pouvoir constituant made of the citizens of the
federation in whose sovereignty, as a constituent power, and by
whose supreme authority the specific constitutional arrangement
is rooted."
In this regard, the Constitution of the European Union looks
like a constitution. It defines and delineates powers, and makes
demands upon constitutional actors, whether they be member
states, citizens, or institutions, that closely resemble the requirements of other federal systems. In its preamble, it appears to
draw its authority from both the people and the member states in
a fashion that is strikingly similar to the U.S. Constitution. For
Weiler (2001, 57), however, there is the rub: "Europe's constitutional architecture has never been validated by a process of constitutional adoption by a European demos and, hence, as a matter
of both normative and political principles and empirical social
observation the European constitutional discipline does not enjoy
the same kind of authority as may be found in federal states
4

Constitution of the United States . See the language of the Preamble and the text of the
Tenth Amendment.
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where their federalism is rooted in the classic constitutional order."
In 1787, thirteen colonies bound by a common language,
heritage and religion came together as a constitutional demos.
Rivalries and disagreements over economics, slavery and state
sovereignty were overcome in order to produce a document that
would sustain the recently won freedom. That which united the
people was greater than that which divided them. But the current
25 member nations that are set to ratify the EU draft document
do not share such characteristics. The cultural and ethnic identity
and national sovereignty of many member states stretches back
for centuries. Some have fought protracted wars against
neighboring nations. Members are separated by language, custom, and religion (or the lack thereof), and some have just recently regained the freedom to express those beliefs and practice
those customs. As a result, any attempt to forge a true Union of
states will face challenges that simply did not exist in the America of the 1780s.
The question, then, is whether a constitution that lacks a
demos-a "we the people" that both supports and calls forth the
document-<:an legitimately claim the authority to bring about a
new, comprehensive political order. Given the historic rivalries
between (what are now) some member nations, and the emergence out of Soviet dominance by the majority of the newly acceded nations, scholars such as Weiler have remained skeptica l.
This is not to say a genuine union of European states cannot
evolve, but only that a constitution may not be the most effective
way to further develop and legitimate such a union.
The problem can be put another way. Since constitutions
grant powers to governmental institutions and governments require legitimacy, any project in constitution-making must seek to
clearly reflect popular will and secure popular support. The EU
actors have been acutely aware of this, as one of their key goals
TlJEJOURNt\L
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has been to lessen the "legitimacy gap" between the EU institutions and its citizens.5 That "gap" has been defined as the popular
perception that government under the EU lacks accountability
and responsiveness to the people. This has been reflected in two
trends. First, each successive treaty has pushed power away from
democratically elected national governments and toward institutions and bureaucracies far removed from democratic accountability. Second, there has been a long-standing perception that
the democratically elected European Parliament, the most "representative" of the EU institutions, has lost power and prestige to
the European Commission and the European Council of Ministers.6 The perception of a democratic deficit has dogged efforts
toward greater consolidation and centralization of power in the
EU in the past, and it remains a critical problem today.7 Since, as
at least one seasoned constitution-maker has observed, the "success of constitutional government depends on the willingness of
people to accept and be bound by legitimate governmental deci5

Expectations have remained high that this Constitution would help remedy the legitimacy gap . As Shaw (2003 , 43) notes, "Since its creation was first announced in December 2001 at the Laeken European Council meeting, very substantial expectations have
been invested in the Convention on the Future of the Union by many observers of the
European integration process . Perhaps it could finally address the yawning legitimacy
gap that appears to have opened up in European public affairs since the time of the Treaty
of Maastricht, leading to a widespread alienation between the activities of the European
institutions and those whom they are meant-like any public bodies-to serve, that is, the
citizens and residents of the member states ."
6
For the student of American politics and government, understanding the key European
Union institutions and their functions (Parliament, Commission , Council of the European
Union, European Council) can be as daunting and difficult as figuring out the British
game of cricket. For a primer on the EU institutions, see the section entitled "How does
the Union work?" at Europa, the website of the European Union (http ://europa.eu.int).
7
The significance of the democratic deficit was clearly shown with the Danish vote that
turned down the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in 1992. The perception that
power would be transferred from accountable national governments to unaccountable
bureaucracies put a brake on further efforts toward integration. For a lucid and comprehensive discussion of the democratic deficit problem , see Andrew Moravcsik (200 I, 161187).
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sions that they greatly fear or intensely dislike" (Seigan, 1994,
2), there is cause for concern. The past two hundred years are
littered with constitutions that failed to accomplish such a degree
of legitimacy and consent.
Size and Simplicity
Another problem for those who hope for success concerns the
unavoidable complexity of the proposed Constitution. The U.S.
Constitution is marked by brevity, clarity, and specificity. The
history of constitutions and constitution-making indicates that
smaller is better when it comes to crafting a constitution intended
to endure for more than a few generations. Jack Straw (2000),
Britain's foreign secretary, has added that "size tells another,
more important story-that of coherence." With few exceptions,
lengthy, detailed constitutions have been marked by redundancy,
inconsistency, and complexity. Short, spare constitutions tend to
be easier to read, understand, and interpret. Further, an accessible
constitution can be read and understood by its citizenry. Given
these considerations, the EU Constitution faces an uphill battle.
As a consolidating document-one that brings together and harmonizes a cluster of already existing treaties-the EU text had to
be comprehensive. The Convention on the Future of Europe was
charged with the task of making the treaty system simpler and
more coherent. It did not have the option of jettisoning the treaties and starting afresh, as the Philadelphia Convention did with
the Articles of Confederation. As a result, the EU text is, of necessity, a lengthy and complex work.
Comparing Conventions
Analysis of the conventions that framed the U.S. Constitution
in 1787 and the European Constitution in 2002-2003 yields some
notable contrasts. For one, the delegates in attendance at each
differed in number, task, and charge. During the summer of
1787, 55 men came together in Philadelphia as permanent, fullTIIE JOURNAL
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time delegates to consider changes and propose amendments to
the Articles of Confederation. Despite the fact that one state,
Rhode Island, did not send a delegation and that some of the
delegates departed before the end of the convention, the process
was marked by unified purpose, consistent attendance and adherence to a code of secrecy. The framers locked themselves into
a building by day, and enjoyed each other's company with dinner
and drink by night. Many already knew each other either personally or by reputation, and they formed close associations with
one another as the summer wore on. Importantly, the participant1i
expected to control the system that they were creating.8 Although
there were varied interests and priorities, and a few major conflicts, all the participants were chosen by state legislatures and
were beholden to the same kind of political unit, the state.9
Also significant was the fact that most of the work done at the
convention was accomplished in general debate. Smaller working committees ironed out the details of major propositions, but
the most important decisions were made among the full convention assembled. Both general debate and ad hoc committees enjoyed the protection of secrecy from the press and from the
inhabitants of Philadelphia. Note taking was restricted, and all
were sworn to silence between sessions. As a result, bold and
radical initiatives could be proposed, considered and debated on
the merits, without fear of reprisals from the public or the press.
The result was a remarkably efficient and determined process

8

As noted by Robinson (2003) , the delegates consisted of most of the leading figures
from their states ; "Of the men at Philadelphia, two went on to become president , one to
become vice-president, four to be federal cabinet ministers, 9 to be senators, 13 to be
members of the House of Representatives , and four to be federal judges ."
9
For what still remains the classic statement on the aspirations and motives of the Philadelphia delegates , see Roche (1961 ). Roche provides compelling arguments explaining
why the convention stuck together through the summer, suffered few departures and no
breaches of secrecy, and found ways to compromise when compromise was necessary .
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that saw the delegates emerge at summer 's end with a spare, specific, and coherent product.
The Convention for the Future of Europe was markedly different. The sixteen month long European congress drew over 200
delegates from over twenty countries. They came from a wide
variety of organizations and posts , and included members of national parliaments, Members of the European Parliament, members of the European Commission, the Economic and Socia l
Committee, and nominated representatives of national governments. 10 Many held no elected position , and it is especia lly
noteworthy that ex-ministers outnumbered serving ministers
three to one. Unlike the American founders , this was not a group
that anticipated having to conduct and control the system that it
was creating. Nor were the delegates sent as full-time or permanent representatives, and so attendance was often sporadic .
Hence the size and composition of the convention, and the
transience of its delegates , led to a markedly different dynamic
as the EU constitutional text was crafted. For the most part, the
lack of fu11-time,permanent delegates meant that the core decision-making over and wording of the document took place in the
smaller working groups, not in the main sessions. 11 One critic
remarked that
One can see the effect in the plenary meetings of the
European Convention, which are too large. At all
times, members are strolling around, chatting quietly,
reading newspapers and using their laptops ... The atmosphere is neither particularly businesslike nor
conducive to rigorous debate. Speakers have only
three minutes to say what they want, and, as one of

0

Supra note 6.
This was not accidental. Critics charge that this was a continuation of elite control over
the drafting process, as the smaller groups were dominated by the Presidium .
'

11
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the delegates told me, 'Everyone just makes their
speech and there is no real dialogue.' As a result, the
real work of the conference is done in the smaller
working groups. Nobody has the time to attend all of
these, and there is no obvious means to ensure coherence. Power thus slips into the hands of ... [the] presidium, and ... secretariat, who were not elected by the
Convention but were chosen by the EU heads of government and are accountable to nobody. 12

In general, European scholars have seen neither a net gain nor
a net loss for the democratic deficit issue during the convention.
The large number and plurality of the delegates has been seen as
a plus, as this helped insure that all significant interests and perspectives were being voiced and noted. However, the process of
the framing itself has been viewed as a minus, as many sections
of the text were drafted and approved without broad debate and
free-ranging discussion of the core issues. 13
Audience
The European drafters found themselves accountable to a
very different constituency than that of the Americans. As noted,
the American delegates were sent by their state legislatures and
were thus accountable to the citizens of those states. They debated and approved the constitutional language with a view to
how such wording would play back home. Popular opinion, at
least as it was thought likely to influence the ratification process,
guided the debates and decisions of the delegates. John Roche
(1961, 812) summed up the summer in Philadelphia as follows:
"Drawing on their vast collective political experience, utilizing
12

Robinson, Paul. 2003. "A Dodgy Constitution," Spectator 291(9105), 8 February, p. 15.
Personal interview with Dr. Miroslav Cerar, Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Ljubljana and Advisor on Constitutional Issues to the National Assembly , Republic of
Slovenia . Ljubljana, Slovenia, September 24, 2004 .
13
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every weapon in the politician 's arsenal , looking con stantly ove r
their shoulders at their constituents , the delegates put togethe r a
Constitution."
The European delegates operated while rank-and-file Europeans expressed little knowledge of, or interest in, the prop osed
constitution. A poll commissioned in mid-2003 by the Elca no
Royal Institute, a Madrid think tank , found that only 1% of
Spaniards knew what the constitutional convention was mea nt to
do . This poll took place after 16 month s of meetings , and as the
draft document was ready to be released. It should again be
noted that the European convention did not take place in sec ret.
If anything, it was a " media event ," with regular press coverage
and a dedicated website with updates and a copy of the dra ft
document posted online at time of release. The lack of public
interest and the presence of vested interests created a very diffe rent kind of accountability. The formation of the European Co nstitution took on the character of policy-making , with dozens of
groups seeking to write protections , rights and regulations into
the text. One commentator dryly remarked that "every conce ivable interest group , from labor unions to nudist groups , has made
suggestio ns" (Coughlan , 2003 , 20). The sum total of all of the
agreements, concessions and provision s swelled the documen t to
an impressive size. While part of the rea son behind this resu lt is
content specific, it is also a result of the process of constitut ipnmaking. The European de legates were beholden more to the
ever-present lobbyists and representatives that worked the floor
of the convention than they were to the home population of Italians or Poles or Belgians. What resulted was, again , a Const itution that bears little resemblance to the brief , structuring kin ds of
documents that have in the past effectively constituted a government and successfully stood the test of time .

T II E J OU RNAL OF N)LITIC

,\L SCJE

C l~

THE FRAMING OF THE EU CONSTITUTION

13

Timin g and Urgency
Two further, and intertwined, factors had a marked influence
on how the EU Constitution was framed and received, and deserve consideration alongside the American experience. The timing of the constitutional convention and the perceived urgency of
the task provided an impetus of the Philadelphia delegates that
was lacking in Brussels.
Half of the time that the newly declared United States of
America was governed by the Articles of Confederation took
place during the War of Independence, from 1776-1781. As the
U.S. emerged from that conflict, it faced mounting debts and the
need for economic recovery and stability. However, the Articles
of Confederation restricted the powers of Congress to requisition
of funds from the states-that is, it could authoritatively request
funds but it could not collect taxes. It had therefore to rely on the
good will of the states to collect and forward taxes; in addition,
the states could not be compelled to pay their share of government costs. The results of these arrangements were not impressive. Between 1781 and 1783, the national legislature requested
$10 million from the states but collected only $ 1.5 million
(Pritchett, 1984, 6). The mid-l 780s shifted from economic malaise to economic crisis and back. By 1786, it was apparent that
some reconsideration of the Articles was needed, since the procedure for amending the document-a unanimous vote by the
states-hamstrung any effort to strengthen its taxing and spend.
14
mg powers.

14
The key language of the amendment provision reads as follows: "A nd the Articles of
this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be
perpetual ; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless
such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State ." Articles of Confederation, Article XIII.
(http://www.usconstitution.net/articles.html#Article 13).
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In response to this state of affairs, James Madison and Alex ander Hamilton held a series of meetings to raise awarene ss of
the shortcomings of the Articles and create interest in a forum for
considering revisions to it. During one of these meeting s, they
urged the states to send delegations to Philadelphia for a meeti ng
to be held the following May . As Epstein and Walker (2001, .S)
explain , their "plea could not have come at a more opportu ne
time. Just one month before , in August 1786, a former Revolutionary War captain , Daniel Shays , had led disgruntled and
armed farmers to rebellion in Massachusetts. They were protest ing the poor state of the economy , particularly as it affecte d
farmers ." Though Shays ' Rebellion was suppressed by state
forces , it was seen as another sign that the Article s neede d
amending. In February 1787, Congress finally issued a call for a
. to reeva 1uate the current nat10na
. I system . 15
convention
The American constitutional convention arose out of economic crisis , growing national identity and unity, a failed (or
failing) charter of government. and a distant armed conflict that
was both symbolic and galvanizing . The cost of failure was high,
and the possibility of failure never far from the thinking of the
delegates. By contrast , the European Un ion's deci sion to craft a
constitution came about during a time of economic prospe rity,
post-independence nationalism (on the part of the newly inde pendent eastern European states), a cluster of confusing though
workable treaties , and a distant armed conflict in Iraq that served
to fracture any sense of unity among the participant nations. For
the delegates to the European convention , the cost of failure was
a reversion to the status quo, not the prospect of economic crisis
and an inability to effectively govern .
A sense of urgency , the experience of an ongoing crisis, and a
prospect of systemic failure, were thu s all absent in the Europe an
15

See the Introduction to the U.S. Constitution in Epstein and Walker (200 I, 5).
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case, and these factors go a long way toward explaining why it
took sixteen months for an acceptable draft document to be
crafted. The slow, bureaucratic process reflected the fact that the
existing treaty system, while complex and redundant, was not
collapsing or on the verge of failure. Some of the key procedural
mechanisms developed in the Treaty of Nice had not yet been
fully implemented, and awaited a follow-up conference in 2004
for further refinement. 16 Indeed, it was only as governmental representatives began to discuss potential changes to the draft in the
Fall of 2003, that the document began to be described as a constitutional treaty. This seemed to better reflect the hybrid nature
of the document: a constitution that sought to harmonize and
streamline the basket of treaties under which the EU operated.
As noted, part of the sense of urgency felt in the American
case resulted from Shay's Rebellion, which preceded the convention by less than a year. Perceived as a sign of the potential for
riot and lawlessness in the face of weak government, this particular armed conflict became a catalyst for positive action. A
more distant armed conflict intruded on the Brussels delegates as
they were concluding their task in early 2003. The United States
responded to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks by conducting military operations in Afghanistan and, in March of
2003, by invading Iraq. Both were among the countries targeted
for supplying aid and assistance to the terrorist bombers. Further,
it was alleged that Iraq was accumulating and stockpiling biological and chemical weapons and potentially could be a supplier
of the same.
16

In December of 2000, the EU heads of state and government met as the European
Council in Nice, France . Most of the discussion centered on making institutional decision -making processes more efficient before the ten countries of eastern and central
Europe joined the EU . The summit produced a number of institutional changes that
would require ratification by all of the (then) 15 member nations . For further detail on the
Nice Treaty, see Wood and Yesilada (2002) .
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The United States invaded Iraq after extended debate and an
eventual stalemate within the United Nations Security Council.
These debates split the key players in the European Union . Great
Britain , Spain, Italy, and Poland supported the U.S. action and
sent military troops to join the U.S.-led coalition forces. France,
Germany and the Benelux nations opposed military action absent
United Nations sanction and became vocal opponents of what
they perceived as naked aggression on the part of the US . While
it is impossible to quantify the degree to which the Iraq war impacted the work of constitution-making in Europe , it is clear that
the unfolding events in the Middle East created more tension and
animosity than common purpose and agreement. As we will see
below, Spain and Poland initially refused to give ground on a key
political issue , the change in voting weight that lessened their
Nice Treaty allotment (See Appendix A) . At the same time,
France and Germany were reneging on their economic commitment to hold debt levels to the percentage of GDP stipulated and
agreed upon under the Stability and Growth Pact. 17 Great Britain
and Italy sought to bring the two sides together , but all the while
seeking their own concessions as the price of diplomacy. Ironically, one of the core purposes of the constitutional project-to
unite Europe and allow it to compete against the world 's sole
superpower - was sidelined by external events that had the
member states choosing sides for or against that very country.
On one key issue , the creation of a foreign minister position
that would provide a unified voice for EU foreign policy, the Iraq
war proved to be a painful reminder that a common view and a
common policy were distant ideals , and that the members states
were anything but united. The war controversies firmed the re17

Under the terms of the European Union ' s Stability and Grow th Pact, EU countries must
main tain publ ic deficits o f no more than 3% of GDP and publi c debt of no more than
60%ofG DP.
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solve of a number of countries-Great Britain especially-to
maintain a veto over foreign policy decisions . In whatever form
a ratified EU Constitution takes, it is hard to imagine that the
member nations will cede their sovereign powers in the areas of
defense policy and foreign affairs.
CONTENT:
KEY THEMES AND PROVISIONS OF THE
EU CONSTITUTCON

A handful of much disputed subjects, which paralleled questions faced by the American framers, provided formidable challenges to the delegates in Brussels and the heads of government
who met in Rome in late 2003. The most important questions
involved the definition and distribution of power within the Union and between the Union and the member states.
Eurofederalism: How to Define and Divide Competences. 18
The most vigorous debates over the draft document concerned the vague distribution of power between the Union and
the member states. Like the lines drawn between the Federalists
and the Anti-Federalists during the American founding, two different sides argued over the proper distribution of powers. Two
years earlier, in 2001, the Laeken Declaration encouraged the
member nations to clarify which competences would be exclusive to the Union, which would be reserved to the member states,
and which might be designated shared competences between the
central and national governments. In a section that calls for a
better division and definition of competence in the EU, the
Laeken delegates raised the following questions in anticipation
of a constitutional convention: At what level is competence exercised in the most efficient way? How is the principle of subsidi18

The word "competences " is used to describe power and its distribution.
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arity 19 to be applied here? Should we not make it clear that any
powers not assigned by the Treaties to the Union fall within the
20
exclusive sphere of competence of the Member States? Hence,
well in advance of the Brussels convention, the Laeken delegates
pointed to the upcoming challenge of clearly defining the federal
principle and of clearly distributing and limiting powers. Their
concern was that, without precise enumeration of competences,
there would be a "creeping expansion" of the powers of the Union and an "encroach ment" on the competences of the membet
states. 21
This concern was realized in 2003, during one of the last sessions of the Brussels convention. Three delegates presented convention president Valery Giscard d'Estaing with a letter of
dissent signed by 18 representatives from 13 current and future
member states. The letter contended that the emerging draft
document undermined national sovereignty by stealth. Echoing
this point of view, former British Prime Minister John Major attacked the constitutional convention and Mr. Giscard d'Es taing
in particular for construing competences and subsidiarity in ways
never envisioned by the member states.
At the heart of Giscard d'Estaing's proposals is the
intent to replace intergovernmental decision-making
with a new written constitution for a single European
entity. The institutions of this European entity would
exercise sovereign powers, with primacy over the
laws of member states in a breathtakingly wide range
of policy areas. Even worse, the existing protection
19

"Subsidiarity " is the doctrine that government action should take place at the lowest
possible, or most sensible, level.
20
Declaration of the Future of the Union, Nos . 3 and 4. Official Journal of the European
Community, C 80/85, March 10, 2001 . The Laeken Declaration . (http ://Europeanconvention .eu.int/pdf/ LKNEN .pdf) .
21
/bid.
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ers inclusion of the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the
American Constitution. But the Supremacy Clause must be understood in context, and that context is one of clearly enumerated
and delegated powers. The supremacy of the Constitution and
the laws made pursuant to it was bound and limited by the specific grants of powers in the preceding articles. The Brusse ls
Convention sought to create the spirit of the Supremacy Clause
without having first set limits on competences via enumerationthe very recommendation given by the delegates in Laeken in
2001. 23 While it is true that the process ofratification was not a
foregone conclusion in America in the 1780s, it can not be said
that there was much confusion over the document itself The
clarity with which the American Constitution answers the three
questions posed by the Laeken Declaration is both revealing and
enlightening.
First, the Constitution of the United States answers the level
of competence question by specifically and clearly delegating
and enumerating powers. Enumeration both empowered and limited national government. Delegation presupposed that power
was granted to government by the people, and that powers not
delegated remain with the people. Given the failures of the A1ticles of Confederation, there was a common expectation that the
newly proposed government would have the power to tax and
spend and to regulate commerce, thus addressing the two most
serious economic weaknesses of Congress under that government. Most of the other Article I, Section 8 powers granted to
Congress involved the economy or the conduct of foreign affairs
and war.
23

Some scholars argue convincingly that this has been achieved, and that acceptance of
the Constitution will ensure the supremacy of the law of the Union over the law of the
member states. Personal interview with Dr. Theo Oehlinger, Professor of Constitutional
Law, University of Vienna. Vienna, Austria, October 21, 2004 . Also see Oehlinger
(2004) .
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of a national veto largely disappears, as almost all the
decisions would be under a system of majority voting. This is utterly unacceptable.
So is the treatment of the concept of ' subsidiarity '
that was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty: it was a
principle that was intended to ensure that the EU
acted only where it could complement national actions. Giscard d'Estaing turns this on its head and redefines the distribution of power by stating baldly
that member states may take action in defined areas
"only if and to the extent that the Union has not exercised its (competences]." 22

Mr. d'Estaing's "loose construction" of subsidiarity created a
serious stumbling block for approval. Once the draft Constitution
was presented to the intergovernmental meetings, specific criticisms over taxation, foreign policy and immigration brought debate and approval to a standstill. In each issue area, the claim
was that the draft authorized interference with, or downright invasion of, national sovereignty. Although the Constitution has
been finalized and enacted, it is likely that the ratification debates will need to re-visit and address these vigorous defenses of
national sovereignty and a strict claim of subsidiarity.
It can be argued that the American Constitution could have
run into the same obstacles and criticisms because of its silences
and sometimes vague enumerations of the distribution of power.
Certainly the ratifying conventions in New York, Massachusetts
and Virginia were hotly contested, and could have led to rejection of the document as a new charter of government. And it
might be argued that Mr. d' Estaing's attempt to bolster the power
of the EU government was no different than the American fram22

Major , John . 2003 . "Why We Must Veto this Alien Constitution, " Spectator,
292(9120) 24 May, pp . 14-16.
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Next , Sections 9 and 10 of Article I link the question of competences with the second challenge of the Laeken Declaration,
that of subsidiarity. In the U.S. Constitution, the positive grants
of power in Section 8 give way to the prohibitions of power
given to the national government in Section 9 and to the states in
Section 10. Section 9 reads like a Bill of Rights for the states,
offering an array of protections from national government interference. Section 10 limits the power of the states, though much
of this section is reflective of Section 8, as it prohibits actions by
the states in the same spheres of economy and foreign affairs
where power has been granted to Congress.
Third, the 1Olh Amendment bridges concerns over subsidiarity
with the call for a clear statement of reserved competences.
While the first eight amendments in the Bill of Rights cover the
rights of individuals from actions of the legislative (1st), executive (2 nd, 3rd , 4 th) and judicial (5th through 8th) branches, the 10th
Amendment protects the powers (not rights) of the states. While
two centuries of Supreme Court interpretation and decision have
served to either enhance or erode the reserved power of the
states, the Amendment has maintained its vitality.
The enumeration of exclusive powers given to the central EU
government in the draft Constitution is actually quite short. Most
of the powers that are usually exercised by national governments
are listed in the concurrent, or shared category. But the proposed
EU Constitution also contains mechanisms that will allow eurofederal authorities to take over as many of those shared powers
as they feel necessary.24 What is missing from the EU text is a
listing of the exclusive powers of the national governments. One
could argue that this is not necessary, since member states retain
all power s that are not otherwise listed- an "understood" 10th
Amendment of sorts. But worries have persisted since the inter24

/bid , at 402-405.
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governmental debates that very little of significance was left at
the national level, and that the movement of power was a oneway street, from the national to the federal level. Consequently,
some critics continue to worry that the lack of clear enumeration
of competences will steadily move power toward Brussels, and
that this issue could become a stumbling block for at least one
member nation as the ratification phase takes place.
Big States and Small States: Weighing Power and Votes
The struggle to establish a balance of power between large,
populous states and smaller, less populated ones has been as difficult in Europe as it was during the founding period in the US.
In 1787, the big states such as Virginia, New'York and Massachusetts were the main proponents of the Virginia Plan, the
scheme of representation that would allot power proportionately
by population. In present-day Europe the 6 biggest statesGermany, France, Britain, Italy, Spain and Poland-account
for
74% of the population in an enlarged EU of 25 member states
and 450 million inhabitants. The question of population politics
is compounded by the economic equation: the same big 6 nations
account for 84% of the European Union's yearly economic output. Under the current voting rules established in the Treaty of
Nice, the big 6 could be outvoted by the other nations, 170-175
25
(See Appendix A). The Benelux nations-Belgium,
Netherlands and Luxembourg-have the same total votes as Germany,
though their combined population is one-third of Germany's.
In the case of the US, the ideological and practical difficulties
within the big state/small state conflict led to the Great Compromise of 1787, which split the legislative branch into a House
25

Note that the Treaty of Nice includes the potential voting weights of both Bulgaria and
Romania, thus bringing the total number of EU members to 27 . Both countries are slated
to join the EU in 2007 . Without these two nations , the " big six " would actually have a
majority vote of 170-151 over the other 19 members .
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of Representatives designed to reflect popular will and whose
membership is proportional to population, and a Senate that
gives each state equal standing and equal representation. 26 By
contrast, the European Constitution has proposed a complicated
system of representation with a number of institutions exercising
"shared comptetences." 27 Two elements of the EU document's
legislative scheme became focal points of debate and disagreement, and led to significant changes in the document prior to its
final approval in mid-2004.
First, the EU Constitution calls for most measures to pass
with a "qualified voting majority," or QVM. As it applies to the
Council of Ministers, which has the authority-jointly with Parliament-to enact legislation and control the budget, the key language reads as follows: "A qualified voting majority shall be
defined as at least 55% of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them, representing member states comprising at least 65% of the population of the Union." 28 This provision
emerges from a big state/small state compromise. Smaller nations can resist legislative measures that threaten their interests
by a simple up-or-down vote, since the Council's composition is
one minister per member state. However, more populous nations
26

The Great Compromise solved an important ideological question as well as addressing
the struggle over the proper framework of representation. Many delegates to the Philadelphia convention were present as representatives of the states , and the Constitution was
a creation of the states . For others, the convention was a gathering of representatives of
the people, and the Constitution was a charter of the people . The text of the Constitution
reflects this tension, as it begins, " We the People of the United States ... " in the Preamble
and closes (if we assume the ratified text closed with the IO"' Amendment) with "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people ." The Great Compromise
allowed partisans of both sides to secure a power base .
27
See sectionentitled"EuropeanParliament
" in Europa. http//europaeu.in\/abc/121essonslprint
_index4_en.hlm.
28
DraftConstitution of the European Union, Article 1-24. http://european-conventioneu.int Also,
note that on questions such as amending treaties, proposing common policy, or allowing a new
country to join the European Union, a unanimous vote is required.

VOL.

33 2005

24

BOYLAN

are able to protect their interests through the 65% population
requirement. Three or four of the largest nation s allied together
can effectively block legislation favored by a large percentage of
the member states. The provision changes the weightings of
votes agreed to in Nice , but fortifies Nice 's original intent. As
much as the Nice format has been criticized, its intent reflected
one of the aims of the Great Compromise: to protect the interests
of both big states and small states .
This aim is also reflected in the voting distribution in the
Council of the European Union . In this institution , the Nice
treaty awarded votes in such a way that clustered the larger countries together , and weighted votes to give the larger current
members a greater voting weight relative to smaller members
(See Appendix A). The small states were compen sated by having
the ability to block a measure if a simple majority of countries
voted against it regardless of size or population . The voting
weights agreed to in Nice will remain in place if the ratification
of the Constitution is either delayed or if it fails.
During the framing phase , Spain and Poland had the most to
lose under the Constitution's proposed qualified majority system
of representation . Under Nice , both had voting power far in excess of their respective populations . Poland also had a political
problem to deal with. It had promoted EU membership to its citizens based on the Nice agreements , and the Polish referendum
on membership reflected those understandings. Polish leaders
did not want to be accused of running a "bait and switch " scam
on the voters, and "not surprisingly , weren 't keen on committing
political suicide by giving in" during the talks in Rome .29 Spain 's
power would also be reduced under the new system . Political
considerations also came into play as the Spaniards considered

29

Editorial, "E urope's Fortunate Failure," Wall Street Journal, 16 December, 2003, p. A- 16.
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their options during the Fall. One American newspaper commented that,
The Spaniards also got a worse deal than at Nice.
Spanish officials are all too aware that the "double
majority" provisions were drafted in a back room at
the time when Spain and Poland were signing up for
a major role in post-war peacekeeping in Iraq. France
and Germany never hid their desire to institutionalize
the anti-Americanism underpinning of their crusade
against the war in Iraq. The double majority would
30
have made it easier for them to set EU policy.

The combination of political, legal, and institutional problems
led Spain and Poland to oppose the double majority provision of
the constitution. In many ways, the debate over the double majority was the only agenda item within the discussions of late
2003. Although a raft of other concerns waited their turn on the
sidelines, the difficulties of big states/small states politics dominated the enactment debates.
Spain and Poland did not prevail in maintaining their voting
weights in the new constitution. Mid-2004 elections brought in a
new government in Spain, and there was a clear indication that
the new administration was going to drop its threat of resisting
passage. Poland, suddenly the lone voice of dissent, soon began
to soften its stance toward the new voting weights. Within a few
weeks, the view that the draft text would be approved and sent
forward for ratification became the prevailing one.
After the debate over voting weights, a second important big
state/small state conflict lurked in the shadows. The smaller EU
states had already voiced their concerns over the proposal to reduce their power and visibility by trimming back the number of
30

Ibid .
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EU commissioners. A tentative decision reached at Nice allowed
the possibility of capping the number of commissioners at
twenty, without further indication of what would happen when
the ten new member states were brought into the Union . There
was some speculatio n that the smaller nations would have to develop a system of rotating commissioners, as it was generally
accepted that the Commission had reached its size limit for effective and efficient decision-making.
The new Constitution proposed to cut the number of Commissioners down to fifteen. What looked problematic coming out
of Nice now looked disastrous. Suddenly, the biggest issue for
the smaller nations was that each should retain the right to have
its own commissioner-shades of the New Jersey Plan! Not surprisingly, the larger states had no taste for this, as they regarded
it as a recipe for an overly large and unwieldy commission . Further, they saw the one-state, one-commissioner system as unfair.
It ceded too much power to the low population, weak economy
states.
In April of 2003, representatives from seven smaller nations
met in Luxembourg in what the German newspapers derided as a
summit of the "Seven Dwarfs." The concerns raised at this meeting and at others that followed led to a postponement of changing the makeup of the Commission. Ultimately, the smaller states
prevailed. Between December 2003 and the approval of the final
draft six months later, the Commission 's structure was revised to
reflect equal representation of the member states. From November 1, 2004 forward, the new Commission held 25 membersone commissioner per country. The constitutional text maintains
the one-representative-per-nation allotment.
Back to Legitimac y
Beyond the discussion of competences hes the more genera l
and perhaps deeper, more difficult problem of democratic legitiT l IE JOUR
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macy. The EU constitution must root its identity and legitimacy
in the people. The earlier cited poll that revealed either ignorance
or ambivalence among Spaniards during the convention process
is indicative of the problem here. Whether we describe the constitutional treaty as federal or confederated in structure, it cannot
be described as a product of "we the people." It remains far more
a treaty among nation states than a constitution of the governed .
Historian Jack Rakove has determined that
The Convention on the Future of Europe was conceived both as a means of rationalizing, redacting,
and (to some extent) superceding the past treaties that
have been instruments of European integration, and
of further defining and refining the "competences "
and the institutions of the EU. Though the ambition
of promoting a genuine constitution for Europe has a
laudable ring to it, the reality still seems far from prosaic. Can a set of institutional arrangements that ultimately depends on negotiations among member
states ever form a constitution in the robust sense?
Can a constititional treaty ever become more constitution than treaty? For what remains most difficult to
conjure is the political identity of the new entity that
Eurofederalists contemplate creating . Critics charge
that this new community ' s political vision is indelibly
elitist, bureaucratic and technocratic and that the new
Europe being fashioned will never mobilize the patriotic affections of the citizens whose lives it will regulate. There is little in the draft constitution that will
alter this view (Rakove , 2003, 33).

The EU draft document seeks to coordinate institutions and
arrangements that have been agreed upon within successive treaties over the last few decades. It has in this sense "inherited" the
legitimacy problem , as it seeks to better codify and integrate the
past treaties. This is why it reads in places more like an adminisVO L.
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trative handbook than a manifesto of political integration. By
whatever name you call it, constitution, constitutional treaty or
charter, the fact remains that the problem of ratification can be
directly linked to the distance between the document and the
people .
There, again, is the rub. The people of Europe must play a
central role in the process of ratifying and confirming the document. In order to gain popular consent and widespread legitimacy, a constitution must reflect and embody popular will. The
clear disconnect between the content of the EU Constitution and
the process of its approval-as each member nation submits it to
some form of vote-may prove to be the most daunting cha llenge of all.
CONF IR MAT IO N:
T HE STIP ULATIO NS AN D PROCE DURES FOR
RATJFICAT IO N

Rules Determine Outcom es
The American presidential election of 2000 bore witness to
the consequences of the rules determining the outcome. The EU
Constitut ion's prov isions for debate, amendment proposal, and
ratification are not neutral and inconsequential guidelines.
Rather, the document's process of confirmation contains as many
challenges and potential pitfalls as its content and its distributio n
of powers.
Unanimous Approval. Spain and Poland were able to press
their claims over voting distribution because each had the power
of the veto. The EU Constitution requires that ratification be
unanimous. In this regard, the EU Constitution bears greater resemblance to the Articles of Confederation than to the Constit ution of the United States. While the Articles had many notab le
weaknesses, its fatal flaw was the requirement that any amendTI J E JOURNAL
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ments to it be approved unanimously by the thirteen colonies.
This proved impossible, and no amendments were passed during
the time that the Articles were in force. The economic, cultural
and social differences between the colonies virtually ensured that
any proposed amendment would intrude on some power or prerogative of one of them. The Articles were thus hidebound, and
the other weaknesses that emerged over time could not be adequately addressed. This took place against a background of a
cluster of colonies that were, comparatively, never sovereign in
31
the full sense of the term, and that had much in common. The
American population consisted in the main of immigrant groups
that were tied more to land than to political units. They were also
quite mobile, able to cross political boundaries in search of economic opportunity or social advancement. For historian Jack
Rakove, the contrast of America in the late 18th Century with
modem Europe could not be more profound.
All EU members are nation-states possessing full political sovereignty and a self-conscious sense of their
historical peoplehood. For many of these nations, the
relative novelty of their status as self-governing entities (as compared to the United States) may deepen,
rather than weaken, their reluctance to relinquish national sovereignty to the faceless bureaucrats in Brussels and to obscure parliamentarians in Strasbourg.
Each European nation-state has conducted its own
foreign relations, and each is aware of the consequences of losing its capacity to assert its national interests (Rakove, 2003, 33-4).

At present, each of the voting EU member states is a veto of
one. Each has the power and ability to procedurally block the
passage of the Constitution or threaten to block passage until
"See earlier discussion and Weiler (2001, 56-57).
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certain concessions are made. The unanimous confirmation requirement enabled Spain and Poland to bring the approval process to a standstill over the first conflict that arose. If agreement
can be reached on voting distribution, all of the rest of the constitutional provisions potentially face a similar response from at
least one member state.
The 1787 Philadelphia convention succeeded in part because
the delegates knew that the Articles of Confederation needed to
be replaced rather than revised. The framers of the Constitution
looked back on its shortcomings as they developed the procedures for ratifying the document. Out went the unanimity requirement. The text called for a supermajority-9 of the 13
colonies-to ratify before the Constitution became the law of the
land. This framework still required a substantial amount of
agreement on the part of the states, but eliminated the threat of
absolute veto from any individual state. As a result, each state
ratifying convention had to face the possibility that it could reject
the new government and that it would still be brought into being
by the other states. The ability to veto and thwart the process was
replaced by the potential to reject and be left as an outcast. While
many of the state debates were heated and the final tallies close,
the whole process took less than one year and the overall vote
was, eventually, unanimous. 32 Much of this success can be linked
to the rules set for ratification.
Amendment Proposals. The months following the unveiling
of the EU draft constitution included time for member states to
propose and discuss potential changes to the text. From October
2003 to March 2004, EU governments planned to meet and come
32

I mark the closing point with New York's vote in July of 1788as the eleventh state to
ratify . North Carolina and Rhode Island did not endorse the Constit ution during this time
and briefly left the Union . 1l1eir eventual decision to ratify and join was more an addendum to the process than an essential component of it. But, their actions did make the
process of ratification unanimous.
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to agreement on amendments, although there was pressure from
the delegates to the Brussels conventions to tinker with the text
as little as possible. 33 The deadline for signing off on the text was
in June, with each country holding its ratification vote in 20052006. While some leaders groused about the timeline for initial
approval, the schedule itself did not occasion much debate. Yet
the lengthy draft text presented too inviting a target and contained something for everyone to question or dislike. As a result,
although the main debates centered on competences and voting
rights, members began to propose amendments concerning taxation, the conduct of foreign affairs and the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. By year-end 2003, the mammoth text
proved to be too hard to swallow in one, unanimous, gulp. And
though approval was secured in June of 2004, it seems unlikely
that all of the built-in compromises and silent omissions will go
unnoticed during the months of ratification debates. As the enacted document was being printed and distributed, a common
observation was that many key decisions had been pushed aside
or rolled back for the time being.
This situation presents another striking contrast with the
American experience. The draft document produced in Philadelphia was spare, barely 7000 words in length, limiting itself to
providing a framework of government and an enumeration of
core powers. And when the Constitution was presented to the
states, it required that approval be without revision or amendment. Amendments could be recommended but could not be required for approval. Article V, itself a model of brevity, spelled
33

Note the charge from convention chairman Valery Giscard d' Estaing , as he warned the
delegates against seeking to amend the document: "If you touch the equilibrium , the
system collapses . If you try to gain by getting satisfaction here and there, the system
collapses and you have the whole thing starting again " (Mitchener , Brandon . 2003 . " Birth
of a Nation? As Europe Unites , Religion , Defense Still Stand in the Way," Wall Street
Journal 11 July, pp A-1 & A-6) .
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out the procedures for proposing and ratifying amendments, and
could be utilized once the Constitution was in force. But, for ratification of the Constitution itself, the Federalist leaders prevailed
in requiring that the approval of the individual states be independent of any amendment proposals.
What enabled the ratification process to succeed in the 1780s,
majority approval of the document without amendments, cannot
be duplicated within the European experience. TI1e European
Constitution is neither spare nor brief, and is brimming with substantive and procedural detail. The prolix Charter of Fundamental Rights is a constitution within a constitution, and will require
considerable debate and review. While it is possible to think that
the unanimity requirement could be dropped in the months to
come, it is difficult to imagine how the EU text could be subject
to a straight "up or down" vote without amendments, or subject
to amendments only after ratification. The length, detail and
complexity of the document make such streamlined procedures
virtually impossible.
CONCLUSION:
VOX POPULI, RATIFICATION, AND PROSPECTS FOR
THE FUTURE

As the EU member states begin the process of ratification,
they will do so by referendum, by parliamentary vote, or, in
some cases, by both methods. 34 We can note one other difference
between this smorgasbord of European approval procedures and
the American counterpart. The Philadelphia convention asked the
states to arrange for state ratifying conventions, separate bodies
that would come together for the sole purpose of considering the
34

At the time this is being written, nine nations will hold a referendum to decide the new
constitution's fate: Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.
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new Constitution and that would reflect popular will in ways that
the individual legislatures could not. The European member
states, by contrast, are subject to the specific mandates within
their own national constitutions.
This is likely good news and bad news for the new Constitution 's prospects. The referendum process may link the document
to the people in ways that the framing process has not yet been
able to do. The votes will extend media coverage and enlarge
discussion of the provisions in the text. A much higher percentage of citizens will weigh the costs and benefits of unity and integration (with the attendant compromises and concessions)
versus continued sovereignty and disaggregation (with the attendant complexity and lack of coordination within the Union).
The bad news is that one or more member states may vote the
Constitution down. The contentious and controversial issues that
have occasioned calls for amending the text may be the same
issues that spell its doom at the ballot box or on the floor of a
national parliament. While governmental officials, bureaucrats
and media elites have at the time of this writing begun to "talk
up" the ratification votes, rank-and-file Europeans remain
slightly supportive of but also largely ignorant about what the
proposed Constitution does and what effect it will have on their
lives. Support, while mildly positive, is perhaps more of a perception that the proposed Constitution would be a good development rather than a vote of support for its specific policy
changes.
While comparing the development of the first constitution of
st
the 21 Century with one of the last constitutions of the 19th Century is fraught with difficulty and subject to spurious connections
and correlations, a survey of the surrounding context, key conflicts and rules for ratification yields important and intriguing
insights. Long and complex constitutions have not had good surVOL.
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vival records over the past three centuries . The grant of power
from sovereign to government must be clear, explicit and
bounded. The procedural rules for ratification must streamline
rather than hamstring the approval process.
The conclusion is not that the European Constitution should
pattern itself after its American counterpart. However , the European framers may want to take a second look back across the
Atlantic and back across time if the current document is to be
ratified as the new charter of government and successfully implemented as the law of the land.
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APPE 'DIX A
VOTI

G WEIGHTS IN THE COLI CIL OF MINISTERS

as Projected in the Treaty of Nice
------- ..-········-··· ---Population Current
New
Country
Germany
82.0
10
29
Britain
59.2
10
29
France
59.0
10
29
Italy
57.6
10
29
S ain
39.4
27
8
Poland
38.7
27
Romania*
22 .5
14
-Netherlands
15.8
13
5
Greece
10.5
5
13
CzechRe ublic
10.3
12
Belgium
10.2
5
12
12
10.1
.-·-- __}:fun~
Porh1 al
10.0
5
12
Sweden
8.9
4
10
Bulgaria*
8.2
10
Austria
8.1
4
10
Slovakia
5.4
7
Denmark
5.3
7
3
Finland
5.2
3
7
Ireland
3.7
3
7
..------·Lithuania
3.7
7
Latvia
2.4
4
Slovenia
2.0
4
Estonia
1.4
4
4
C
rus
0.8
--Luxembourg
0.4
2
4
Malta
0.4
3
* Bui aria and Romania as ire to ·oin the EU in 2007.
-
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